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14 May 1948

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR****Subject: Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare**

1. The SANACC Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare met at 10:00 today in Mr. Block's office with the following members present:

Chairman - Mr. Ralph Block	- State Department
Comdr. David Knoll	- Navy Department
Major Grey	- Air Force
Col. William McNamee	- Army Department
[REDACTED]	- CIA

2. Mr. Block asked the Subcommittee members whether they would have any objections to his calling the report an annual report. We told him that we disagreed with calling the report "annual" or "interim." Then I reiterated what I have said on many previous occasions within the past few weeks that we should approach our work in a "manly" fashion, recognizing that all questions of policy regarding psychological warfare are now before the National Security Council for determination, and, accordingly, it seems puerile on our part to delve into substantial questions in this field until the Council has made its decision and the necessary instructions are sent to us and to all other groups as to what we shall do, if anything.

3. Mr. Block positively disagreed with this viewpoint and stated that officials of the National Security Council and of the Department of State have told him to continue his work with the Subcommittee. Two individuals from the National Security Council observed that no one knew exactly how long it would take the Council to arrive at a decision and the comments he received from the "high official" in the Department of State were to the effect that we do not know "officially" what action, if any, the National Security Council will take.

4. I then politely asked Mr. Block if he would condescend to tell the Subcommittee who the officials were at the National Security Council and at the Department of State who told him to continue the Subcommittee work. Smilingly, he refused to do so, except to state that the man from the National Security Council was on the Secretariat of the Council.

5. Thus, with the idea of forward progress, Mr. Block told the members of the Subcommittee that he had been in touch with Mr. Elmer Davis, who was going to give us his only copy of the official OWI report which he had prepared for the President. We were also informed that Colonel Thompson, a social scientist with Brookings Institute, would appear before the Subcommittee next Wednesday.

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6. Then we came to a discussion of what type of report we would prepare and at the same time we offered comments on the draft which Mr. Block had worked up.

7. Commander Knoll obviously did not like Mr. Block's draft and stated in a rather caustic manner that if the Chairman, acting unilaterally, wanted to submit a report himself he could do so and send it forward in whatever manner he desired without concurrence of the Subcommittee members. Knoll showed by files that this Subcommittee came into existence by the passage of letters between Secretary Patterson and Forrestal early in 1946. Forrestal concurred in Patterson's suggestion that a group be established to study psychological warfare and added that the Department of State should be included in such a group, and that responsibility for the functions be placed in the Joint Staff. This original group developed the basic 304 which is the foundation for the SANACC Subcommittee as it exists today.

8. In redrafting the report, it was suggested that inconsequential items be dropped or placed in an appendix. Such items included the names of individuals who represented the departments and agencies at different times; the securing of permanent headquarters for the Subcommittee, etc. Mr. Block did not like this suggestion because he desired to show how little work was done by the Subcommittee on account of extraneous circumstances beyond his control. Hence, he spoke at length about the problem of carrying on work in a consecutive manner when the individuals of the Subcommittee have been changed so frequently by their own agencies, and have never been assigned to him on a full-time basis, even though he secured permanent office space for them.

9. I observed that such a negative type of report would certainly not make friends or influence people in the manner in which we had desired. Hence, we should be positive in our approach and recommend what we feel is necessary for any such undertaking in the future.

10. Commander Knoll agreed to prepare a new draft of the historical part of the report and he suggested that I prepare a statement of the problems. I told him that under my Agency's instructions I was a member of the Subcommittee for observational purposes only. Knoll's reaction was somewhat violent. He quickly thumbed through the SANACC papers to tell me what I already knew, that the CIA representative on paper was the same as any other Subcommittee member and, furthermore, he stated that his bosses in the Navy Department had told him the same thing I had been told. I responded to Commander Knoll by telling him that if he refused to prepare any part of this report I would not be the least upset, and as we left the meeting he did regret that he flew off the handle stating that his people are always asking him why he seems to be the member of the Subcommittee who prepares all the papers.

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11. As we left the meeting, Colonel McNamara informed me that he was working on a paper and that he wanted to know the names of the OSS men who were in the Army during the last war. I believe that his only immediate objective is to have such names indexed and filed in the Department of the Army, so that this field might be quickly activated in the event of an emergency. He desired to find out how such requests should be made on CIA. I told him I would refer the matter to higher officials and inform him next Tuesday.

[Redacted]

ICAPS Member

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